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Abstract 
 
  
Public-Private-Partnerships are long-term, relational contracts between a 
public-sector sponsor and a private partner to deliver infrastructure 
projects across a range of economic sectors. Efficiency gains may derive 
from risk transfer and bundling different tasks within a single contract. 
We study the factors explaining the scope of bundling. We focus on the 
choice between weak vertical integration, which includes operational tasks 
alone or construction tasks alone, versus strong vertical integration, which 
involves the combination of operational and construction tasks. We 
utilize a new data set that includes 553 PPPs concluded in the U.S. 
between 1985 and 2013. 
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Strong versus Weak Vertical Integration:  
Contractual Choice and PPPs in the United States 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The term public-private partnership, or PPP, is often used to describe long-term, relational 
contracts between a public-sector sponsor and a private partner that are created to deliver large 
infrastructure projects in a range of economic sectors. PPPs have been used for decades in 
many countries. Popular sectors include water, transport, energy, etc.1 Their use in the U.S. is 
rising rapidly, with many U.S. states passing laws encouraging such a contractual approach. 
We here focus on the structure of PPPs and the bundling of various aspects of project 
delivery. We do so because bundling is –together with risk transfer- the critical characteristic 
distinguishing PPPs from traditional procurement (Albalate, 2014).2 We consider bundling 
construction and operational elements of project delivery. In particular, we examine the 
determinants of what we term strong vertical integration, or the combining of construction and 
operational tasks together, versus weak vertical integration, under which different project phases 
are combined, either within construction or within operations only.  
The distinction between strong and weak vertical integration is important because 
many anticipated benefits from PPPs rely on synergies between construction and operation. 
Understanding why governments engaging in PPPs choose to bundle construction and 
operations (i.e. strong vertical integration), or to leave them separate is thus essential.  
We assembled a large data set on PPP projects using the International Major Projects Survey 
collected by Public Works Financing (PWF). The PWF Survey includes the universe of PPP 
projects in North America. PWF requests detailed project information from all project 
                                                            
1 See Chong et al. (2009) and Cruz et al. (2014) for recent papers on PPPs experiences in different sectors.  
2 Traditional procurement refers to a design-bid-build (DBB) contract. Project design is placed out for bid, and 
construction of that design is bid out separately. The public sector finances the project, while operating and 
maintaining the project over its life. Smaller traditionally delivered projects may not be bid out at all. 
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developers. Developers have strong incentives to comply with that request because their 
annual ranking (highly valued in the industry) is based on reported information. PWF then 
cross checks that information with the Transportation Infrastructure Financing and Innovation 
Act (TIFIA) loan database, as well as several other data sources. 
We use data on 553 U.S. PPP projects signed between 1985 and 2013. We model 
determinants of the weak versus strong vertical integration decision using multinomial logistic 
regression. We include financial, economic and political variables. We find that some financial 
variables are important drivers of that choice, while political variables have little influence. 
Sector-specific economic variables are strongly predictive of the strong-versus-weak bundling 
choice and may account as proxies for transaction costs, externalities and commercial risk.  
II. Related literature 
The PPP concept is broad (Hodge, Greve and Boardman, 2010). For example, the European 
Commission (2003:96) defines PPPs as “the transfer to the private sector of investment 
projects that traditionally have been executed or financed by the public sector”. The Asian 
Development Bank (2008: 28) distinguishes five basic types of PPPs (Service contracts, 
management contracts, lease contracts, concessions, and build-operate- transfer -or BOT-), on 
the basis of differences in commercial risk and overall risk level assumed by the private sector.3 
Viewed broadly, PPPs are contractual frameworks that enhance the role of private 
infrastructure participants and include shifting risks to the private partner. Risk sharing 
between taxpayers and the private partner is a key PPP issue (Engel, Fischer and Galetovic, 
2014), that requires that the public sponsor pay a risk premium. PPPs range from simple 
                                                            
3 In a BOT contract, a private entity receives a concession from the public sector to finance, design, construct, 
and operate a facility for an agreed-upon period. Operation is transferred back to the public sector at the end of 
the concession period. Close relatives of BOT contract are the Build-Own-Operate (BOO), in which the private 
partner owns the facility for a time, and the Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), in which the private partner owns the 
facility for the construction phase only, transfers ownership to the public sponsor, and commences operation. 
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management contracts to complex design-build-finance-operate (DFBO) contracts. The PPP 
contract typically bundles different tasks while transferring significant risk to the private sector. 
The industrial organization literature has adopted a more restrictive view of bundling in 
PPPs. It requires a PPP to combine construction and operations within one contract. Only 
what we term strong vertical integration is here considered to be a PPP. An identifying feature 
of PPPs is then that the same private sector firm (or consortium of firms) building the asset 
also operates it (Martimort and Pouyet, 2008: 394; Engels Fischer and Galetovic, 2014: 11).  
To summarize, bundling exists if only one or two firms are organized as a consortium 
and operate as a single unit, rather than operating independently under different contracts with 
the government (Bennett and Iossa, 2006). Together with risk sharing, and B&O bundling, 
such bundling emerges as the third distinctive feature of PPPs (Iossa and Martimort, 2015:6-7).  
Theoretical contributions have examined the conditions under which contracts are 
likely to take the form of a strong vertical integration. Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2004, 6&21) 
link the government’s choice of PPP to service provision costs. They conclude that strong 
vertical integration is chosen when those costs are low and the required investment is small. 
Alternatively, conventional procurement is chosen when service provision costs are high and 
the investment required is large. However, when such costs are small, the transaction costs 
associated with PPPs can dominate and make conventional procurement or public production 
more likely, as stressed by Iossa and Martimort (2015).  
With PPPs, tendering periods can be long and the contracting process costly; 
procurement costs may be between 5 and 10 percent of total capital costs (Yescombe, 2007). 
Moreover, the relative impact of procurement cost rises as the project’s capital value declines. 
High transaction costs can thus be a significant barrier to strong vertical integration for low 
capital value projects. Overall, the relationship between capital value and the probability of 
choosing a PPP is likely to be parabolic.  
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Going beyond overall costs of investment and service delivery, Bennett and Iossa 
(2006) analyze synergies between different project phases. They distinguish between positive 
externalities (i.e. when quality-enhancing investment in building reduces operational costs), and 
negative externalities (i.e. when quality-enhancing investment increases operational costs).4 
They predict that bundling construction and operation will be more frequent with positive 
externalities because the builder will be able to internalize the benefits of quality-enhancing 
investment on operational costs. This occurs in prison provision, where a better infrastructure 
design may reduce operational costs for a given safety level (Martimort and Pouyet, 2008).  
Alternatively, strong vertical integration generates underinvestment in the case of 
negative externalities because greater investment increases operational costs. That discourages 
the private partner from undertaking those investments if it is also in charge of operations. 
Airports offer an example. The complexity created by innovation requires that new procedures 
and sophisticated management tools be learned and adopted (Martimort and Pouyet, 2008). 
 The theory of incomplete contracts provides a useful analytical framework for studying 
situations where contracting is complex as in a PPP. Using that framework, Hart (2003) and 
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that private production creates incentives to reduce 
costs by means of reducing quality. The contracted firm may thus sacrifice quality to reduce 
total costs (e.g. Bennet and Iossa, 2006a) unless quality is well defined and highly specified. 
Building on those insights, theory implies that strong vertical integration is preferable when 
quality is contractible (i.e. Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Iossa and Martimort, 2015). 
Regarding risk-related characteristics, Iossa and Martimort (2012) show that PPP 
benefits are higher when demand and operational risks are low. PPPs on existing motorways or 
toll roads therefore benefit from well-documented traffic information, vastly improving 
                                                            
4 A more general term for positive externalities would be that of 'complementarities', which imply that the 
marginal profitability of one action increases with the level of another (Lafontaine and Slade, 2012, p. 1001).  
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revenue forecasts. Traditional procurement may thus be preferable for new toll roads, where 
traffic and demand risk is considerably more difficult to predict.  
Bennett and Iossa (2006) study the relationship between strong vertical integration and 
intrinsic asset characteristics, and show that reduced specificity for public use at the contract’s 
end generates higher PPP benefits. Investments with strong network characteristics and the 
attendant high sunk costs are less appropriate for PPP than facilities with multifunctional traits. 
 Potential competition is an important driver of PPP-created benefits. The number of 
potential bidders is positively related to the decision to use PPP (Iossa and Martimort, 2015). 
Auriol and Picard (2013) show that private water delivery is more frequent in large cities; the 
number of potential vendors is positively related to the service potential market size. The PPP-
choice literature also emphasizes the role of financial incentives. Auriol and Picard (2013) 
stress limiting government spending as a motivation for PPP use, arguing that strong vertical 
integration is more frequent during financial crises. 
Most prior empirical work on contract design has focused on the compensation 
scheme, financial terms, or control rights (see e.g. Lafontaine and Slade, 2012). We are the first 
to empirically analyze the extent of vertical integration in contract design. We next describe the 
data used to study the strong-versus-weak vertical integration choice. 
III. Empirical Strategy 
III.1 Data  
Our main data on PPP projects were gleaned from the International Major Projects Survey 
collected by the Public Works Financing newsletter, which contains information on PPP projects 
since 1985. We use information on 553 U.S. PPP projects signed between 1985 and 2013., 
which cover several economic sectors, including Water, Roads, Rail, Airports, Ports, Prisons 
and other Facilities (i.e. sport stadiums, schools, street lights, and parking, among others).  
Those PPPs are governed by different contract types, including Management 
Contracts, Design and Build, Leases (with or without improvements), Joint Development 
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Agreements,5 Concessions, and other relatively complex arrangements. Those contracts include 
different tasks, such as Design, Build, Finance, Maintain or Operate. We omit military housing 
projects (sponsored by the Federal government) and those implying full privatization (asset 
sales). Such projects do not fit within our characterization of PPPs. This leaves 475 projects in 
the database signed by local and State authorities in the U.S. between 1985 and 2013.  
Table 1 displays information on major economic sectors included in our sample, as 
well as contract type. Most PPPs in the sample involve water/wastewater and road projects, 
followed by fewer rail, airports, prisons, bridges and tunnels, ports and other facility projects.  
(Insert table 1 around here) 
We distinguish between strong-versus-weak vertical integration PPP contracts. As 
noted, strong vertical integration refers to the combination of construction and operational 
tasks, while weak vertical integration combines specific tasks on either the construction or 
operational side only. The last column in Table 1 offers information on the percentage of 
strong bundling PPPs in each economic sector in the sample. Our sample includes 232 (49 
percent) weak vertical integration PPPs and 242 (51 percent) strong-vertical-integration PPPs.  
Table 2 shows distinctions made between PPP contracts in order to divide the sample 
into weak vertical integration versus strong vertical integration. 
(Insert table 2 around here) 
III.2 Variables  
We focus on the choice between alternative contract types. Our dependent variable is 
categorical, and takes different (but not ordered) values to identify different contract types. If 
PPP contracts have strong vertical integration features (bundling construction and operational 
tasks) we group them into category 1, which is our reference category. We group contracts 
                                                            
5 Lease contracts with improvements imply that the lease included a commitment to undertake new investments 
in the existing facility. Joint development agreements refer to PPPs undertaken by joint venture companies with 
equity contributed by the private and public sectors (see Moszoro and Gasiorowski, 2008). 
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including only design-build tasks into category 2. Management-related contracts are in category 
3. We thus compare weak vertically integrated alternatives to strong vertical integration. 
We considered alternative groupings to obtain a better fit for our empirical model. 
Specifically, categories 2 and 3 were retained, but we split the reference category by including 
in category 4 those PPPs with strong vertical integration that exclude design tasks. We defined 
category 5 as vertically integrated PPPs that exclude operational activities. That allows us to 
examine how externalities and synergies associated with the design task can affect contract 
decisions and how demand risk may influence the same.  
Independent variables can be grouped into: (i) financial variables to account for the 
pragmatic decision of policy makers; (ii) binary variables identifying different economic sectors, 
which capture intrinsic characteristics of various infrastructure types; (iii) variables that proxy 
for political preferences; and (iv) other control variables. We estimate the likelihood of strong 
versus weak vertical integration in PPPs as impacted by financial, economic and political 
factors. To some extent, bundling is present by construction in all PPPs in our sample. Thus, 
we do not address the determinants of PPP use per se, as have other authors.  
Table 3 lists our variables and data sources. We lag financial variables to the year prior 
to the PPP agreement to avoid endogeneity. Including all economic sectors in our estimation 
would generate perfect collinearity. We dropped one economic sector from our model and use 
Facilities as the reference category. Facilities are delivered through strong vertical integration 
PPPs in 71 percent of the cases (see table 1), one of the highest percentages in our sample.  
(Insert table 3 around here) 
III.2.A. Financial Predictors 
Tax Income: State and local tax revenues per capita (in thousands) in the State where the project 
was signed, in the year prior to the agreement. We view this as a proxy for fiscal pressure and 
the ability of governments to raise money from the state’s taxpayers. We expect this variable to 
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be negatively correlated with strong vertical integration, since states with larger per capita 
revenues may rely less on private investment in infrastructure.  
Expenditures: Local and state government expenditures per capita in the state where the 
project was signed, year prior to the agreement. This variable reflects the government’s fiscal 
burden and its need to seek private financing. We expect a positive correlation between this 
variable and strong vertical integration because states with greater per-capita spending are likely 
to rely more on private investment and to bundle construction and operations in PPP projects.  
Debt: State debt outstanding (in millions of current dollars) per capita, year prior to the 
project agreement. This captures states with fiscal stress resulting from relatively high debt 
levels. We predict a positive relationship between this variable and strong vertical integration 
since a larger debt burden will encourage greater reliance on private partnerships.  
Contract Size: Project size, as measured by capital cost, in thousands of U.S. dollars divided 
by the relevant census region’s population. Consistent with extant literature, we expect a 
parabolic relationship between capital value and strong vertical integration. We used a 
logarithmic transformation of this variable.  
III.2.B. Economic Sector Predictors 
We include 10 sector-specific binary variables to indicate which sector each project most 
closely represents. Each is relative to facilities, which is the reference sector. Our literature 
review revealed that facilities are prone to strong vertical integration because their quality is 
contractible, easy to measure, and transaction costs are likely to be smaller. In contrast, road 
and rail projects typically bear large commercial risks, which may frustrate strong vertical 
integration. This leads to less frequent use of strong-vertical-integration PPPs and greater weak 
vertical integration during the project’s management or construction phases. 
Network infrastructure generates greater asset specificity relative to facilities. This suggests 
that roads, rail and water PPPs will be negatively correlated with strong vertical integration, 
except in the case of Bridges and Tunnels, which have more common traits with facilities; 
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Ports, Airports and Prisons despite their asset specificity, bear less commercial risk. Their 
economic cost – limiting the hold-up problem – is much lower than that of network 
infrastructure. We do not expect large differences between stand-alone infrastructure and 
facilities, but do expect large differences between network infrastructure and facilities. 
Our economic sectors can reflect the extent of asset specificity and ease of measurement, 
which are drivers of transaction costs. It is useful to account directly for those factors using 
specific indicators of asset specificity and ease of measurement. We use the average specificity 
and ease of measurement ratings in Brown, Potosky and Van Slyke (2005) for services 
contracted out by U.S. municipalities. We can thus examine the role of transaction costs in 
explaining strong-versus-weak vertical integration in alternative models.  
III.2.C. Political Predictors 
Republican Governor: A dummy variable set to one if the governor (when the project is signed) is 
Republican, zero otherwise. To the extent that Republican governors are more business 
friendly and more market oriented than their Democratic counterparts, they are more likely to 
utilize strong-vertical-integration PPPs. 
III.2.D. Control Predictors 
Population: State population. This is a proxy for the size of the market where the project is 
signed. Private investors are likely to find facilities in populated markets more attractive. Based 
on our literature review, we expect a non-linear relationship between population and strong 
vertical integration. We apply a logarithmic transformation to this variable.  
Sponsor: Categorical variable set to zero if the project sponsor is a local government; 
one if a state government. Because higher levels of government typically receive more public 
resources, we expect that variable to reduce strong vertical integration.  
Year: Variable indicating the year in which the PPP was signed. This captures a time 
trend and thus long-run changes in PPP policy. Economic crisis may have impacted PPP 
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design, so it is important controlling for time. We expect Year to positively impact strong 
vertical integration.  
PPP Legislation: Variable indicating the degree of PPP favorability of a State’s legislation 
in the year and State in which the PPP is consummated. This variable was developed and 
described in Geddes and Wagner (2013) and used in Albalate, Bel and Geddes (2015) to 
evaluate the impact of PPP legislation on private infrastructure investment. It is a synthetic 
indicator of how experts value the degree of PPP favorability of different provisions included 
in the State’s legislation. Higher values of this variable indicate a better institutional framework 
stemming from reduced uncertainty and regulatory risks, which are essential to engaging in 
long-term relationships and large sunk investments as those usually involved in PPPs bundling 
construction and operation tasks. Table 4 offers some descriptive statistics. 
(Insert table 4 around here) 
III.3 Methods 
We use multinomial logistic regression to model the contract-type decision, particularly 
regarding the strong vs. weak vertical integration. Our empirical analysis relies on estimating 
the determinants of strong-versus-weak vertical integration in U.S. PPPs. Equation (1) below 
contains the above-mentioned four variable groups:6 
௜ܻ ൌ  ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶܽݔ_ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௜ ൅ ߚଶܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁ݏ ௜ ൅ ߚଷܦܾ݁ݐ௜ ൅ ߚସܮ݋݃ ሺܥ݋݊ݐݎܽܿݐ_ܵ݅ݖ݁ሻ௜
൅ ߲ଵܦௐ௔௧௘௥௜ ൅ ߲ଶܦௐ௔௦௧௘௪௔௧௘௥௜ ൅  ߲ଷܦே௘௧௪௢௥௞_ோ௢௔ௗ௦௜ ൅ ߲ସܦ஻௥௜ௗ௚௘_்௨௡௡௘௟௜          
൅ ߲ହܦோ௔௜௟௜൅ ߲଺ܦ௉௢௥௧௦௜ ൅  ߲଻ܦ஺௜௥௣௢௥௧௦௜ ൅   ଼߲ܦ௉௥௜௦௢௡௦௜ ߲ଽܦை௧௛௘௥௦௜     
൅  ߛଵܦோ௘௣௨௕_ீ௢௩௘௥௡௢௥௜ ൅  ߤଵܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎ௜
൅ ߤଶܮ݋݃ሺܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ሻ௜  ൅ ߤଷܲܲܲ_݈݁݃݅ݏ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߤସܻ݁ܽݎ௜ ൅  ߝ௜ 
           
In equation (1) Yi takes the value 1 for strong vertical integration, 2 for if some type of 
weak vertical integration was chosen among those within the construction phase and 3 for 
                                                            
6 Model (1) includes a time-trend variable (Year). We also considered models with year dummies. These show 
consistent results for financial, economic sector and control regressors. Those models however return negative 
values in the McFadden Pseudo-R2, which suggests a poor fit. We thus report models with time trends.  
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those within the operational phase. The economic sector Facilities is not included in the 
equation because they are the omitted (or benchmark) category in interpreting the economic 
sector coefficients. We are careful to avoid perfect collinearity. The reference category for the 
dependent variable is strong-vertical-integration contracts. 
We estimate (1) using a multinomial logistic regression because having discrete 
(unordered) values does not allow using OLS. We have a dependent variable with different 
values (categories of PPP contracts), so we cannot apply binary response models such probit 
or logit. Our model is analogous to a logistic regression model, but the response variable’s 
probability distribution is multinomial instead of binomial. Also, the J-1 multinomial logit 
equations compare each categories 1, 2…J-1 to category J (in our case strong vertical 
integration), whereas the single logistic regression equation is a contrast between successes and 
failures. Finally, standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and w 
standard errors are clustered by State or by economic sector.7 
We compared multinomial logistic regressions according to different groupings of 
contracts, starting with a 3-categoriy model. Table 5 displays the type of multinomial models 
we compared, and Table 6 shows their joint-significance tests. Comparisons of model fit are 
possible through the log likelihood values and the use of McFadden pseudo-R2. In all cases we 
find that according to the likelihood ratio chi-square our models are jointly significant. Results 
on the log-likelihood and pseudo-R2 values suggest that the most restricted model 
(multinomial 1) is the best model in terms of fit and explanatory power. We used strong 
vertical integration contracts as the reference category in that model. The two remaining 
categories are those that only bundle construction or operational tasks.8 
(Insert table 5 around here) 
(Insert table 6 around here) 
                                                            
7 We considered State fixed effects (separately) but the maximum likelihood method did not converge.  
8 The Hausman test for the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) supports the null hypothesis of Odds 
(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) being independent of other alternatives in all models with different categories.  
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We also compared the multinomial model to the logistic regression model -which is 
just a special case of the multinomial model in which the dependent variable is dichotomous- 
considering strong versus weak vertical integration. We find support for the former, rejecting 
the use of the logistic regression method. The next section discusses estimates for the selected 
model (multinomial 1) only. 
IV. Estimates 
Table 7 reports estimates for our main model (multinomial 1). This model utilizes our full 
sample, in which all observations are included and standard errors are clustered by economic 
sector (I, II, III), and by State (IV, V, VI). Predicted marginal effects for each category of PPP 
contract are reported (instead of coefficients), which would be difficult to interpret in 
multinomial logistic models and operationally irrelevant.  
In column (I), we report the predicted marginal effects associated with the choice of 
PPP contracts with strong vertical integration (bundling of construction and operation), while 
columns (II) and (III) report predicted marginal effects for weak vertical integration contracts 
within the construction and the operational phases, respectively.  
(Insert table 7 around here) 
IV.1 Financial variables 
Marginal effects in Columns (I), (II) and (III) indicate that the level of (lagged) expenditures 
per capita is positively related to strong vertical integration, negatively related to weak vertical 
integration within operational tasks and statistically irrelevant for PPP contracts with 
construction-tasks bundling. This result is consistent with predictions from Auriol and Picard 
(2013), as States with larger spending are oriented to bigger participation of private partners in 
the development and provision of services and infrastructure. This result is also consistent in 
models where standard errors are clustered at State level, as columns (IV), (V) and (VI) show. 
Log of contract size reveals a similar pattern, with a positive relationship to strong 
vertical integration in column (IV) and a negative and statistically significant correlation in 
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column (VI). If we view contract size as a proxy of provision costs, we find some evidence of 
the relationship between the bundling decision (vertical integration) and service provision 
costs, as inferred from Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2004). Indeed, these two financial variables 
indicate that financial constraints are important for the bundling decision. Nonetheless, tax 
income per capita is statistically insignificant for all contract types, while State indebtedness is 
only significant (and negative) in the case of weak vertical integration within the operational 
phase and only when we account for economic sector clusters (column III). 
IV.2 Economic sectors 
Road projects are not associated with any particular type of PPP vertical integration when 
compared to this project reference group (i.e. facilities). When State clustering is included, we 
find a positive, statistically significant impact on PPPs that bundle construction tasks only. Rail 
projects follow a similar pattern, but marginal effects are not statistically significant. This 
suggests that rail is not associated with a particular PPP contract type.  
Bridges and tunnels provision, however, consistently relies less on weak-vertical- 
integration PPPs that include the operational phase. Airports and prison provision relies more 
heavily on strong vertical integration regardless of the clustering type used. The former is also 
related to less contracts that bundle construction tasks – exactly as ports do - and the latter to 
less contracts that bundle operation tasks.  
We find no significant association between water distribution projects and any type of 
contracts except in column (VI). We there find a positive correlation with contracts that 
bundle operational tasks only. Wastewater projects show a positive relationship with that 
contract type, but only when we cluster standard errors at the State level. We also find that 
wastewater projects are less likely to use construction-task bundling contracts. Finally, activities 
in the Others group are less likely to rely on strong-vertical-integration PPP project delivery.  
IV.3 Political and control variables.  
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Marginal effects indicate that the governor’s political party is not associated with any particular 
type of PPP contract vertical integration. This conclusion remains regardless of the clustering 
type used. We obtain a similar conclusion for public sponsor type, except for column (V), 
which suggests, at the 10 percent significance level, that State governments are more likely to 
rely on weak vertical integration within the construction phase. Neither PPP legislation nor the 
time trend impacts the PPP bundling decision.  
 Population, however, has an important effect on contract choice. More populated 
States are associated with more projects relying on strong vertical integration. That may be due 
to higher expected demand and use of infrastructure services provided, which reduces 
commercial risk. Populated States are less likely to rely on weak vertical integration that only 
involves tasks within the construction phase. Population is irrelevant for contracts that only 
bundle operation tasks.  
IV.4. The role of transaction costs 
Sector variable estimates show the relevance of transaction costs as a key aspect of the PPP 
bundling decision. Economic sector variables are likely to capture differing project traits linked 
to transaction costs. Those include asset specificity and ease of measurement. We next account 
directly for asset specificity and ease of measurement although it reduces our sample size. 
We rely on asset specificity indicators and ease of measurement obtained in Brown, 
Potosky and Van Slyke (2005) for services contracted out by U.S. cities. We identified those 
sectors that appear in our sample. Although most of the Brown, Potosky and Van Slyke (2005) 
service list does not appear in our sample, we were able to utilize values for 163 projects. We 
applied the multinomial 1 model, but replaced economic sectors with their asset specificity and 
ease of measurement variables. Table 8 reports estimates. 
(Insert table 8 around here) 
Our results indicate that both variables are relevant for the strong vs. weak vertical 
integration choice. Strong integration is highly correlated with asset specificity, but unaffected 
14 
 
by measurement ease. Both transaction cost variables impact weak integration contracts, but in 
opposite directions: asset specificity reduces the likelihood of reliance on weak vertical 
integration in the construction phase, while ease of measurement increases it.  
Although a similar conclusion is obtained for the asset specificity impact on weak vertical 
integration in the operational phase, measurement ease now reduces the likelihood of choosing 
that contract form. However, the marginal effect is very small in the construction phase even if 
it is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In this regard, our estimates are consistent 
with theoretical predictions in Bennett and Iossa (2006) and Iossa and Martimort (2012, 2015). 
V. Conclusions 
To our knowledge, this is the first detailed empirical study of the strong-versus-weak vertical 
integration PPP contract choice. That choice is important in assessing the expected efficiency 
gains that could be realized due to bundling-derived synergies. Those depend to a large extent 
to whether bundling involves operational and construction tasks (which provides the largest 
scope for such efficiencies) versus tasks that remain within the operational or construction 
aspects, respectively. We refer to the bundling of operational and construction tasks as strong 
vertical integration, and tasks on the operation or construction sides only as weak vertical integration.  
We find that government expenditures per capita increase the likelihood of strong vertical 
integration and reduce it in case of weak vertical integration within the operational phase. 
However, other financial variables such as debt per capita and taxes per capita do not play an 
important role. When tasks bundled belong to the operational phase, contract size is positively 
correlated with strong integration and negatively correlated with weak integration. 
We also conclude that the economic sector under consideration strongly influences 
bundling choice, which may be due to transaction costs, commercial risk, and initial 
investments. Indeed, sector dummies may act as proxies for transaction costs. We explored 
that possibility using a reduced project sample that included asset specificity and ease of 
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measurement variables. That exploration suggests that both are relevant factors in the choice 
between strong versus weak vertical integration.  
Our results suggest that PPP design may be a pragmatic decision rather than a political 
instrument. The decision to undertake a PPP or not (which implies inclusion of the private 
sector in the delivery) may include political considerations while choice between strong versus 
weak vertical integration does not. Regarding controls, population is positively correlated with 
strong vertical integration. Other variables considered are generally unrelated to the type of 
vertical integration chosen.  
Because ours is the first empirical examination of the strong versus weak vertical 
integration decision, we view our conclusions as preliminary. Further empirical research is 
needed. While we focus on the U.S. case, it is reasonable to expect that different national 
regulations, contracting practices, legal origins, and legal traditions will produce different PPP 
designs. They may also impact factors leading to decisions about the combining operational 
and construction tasks, as with decisions regarding risk transfer via PPPs. Our results indicate 
that bundling decisions are neither random nor arbitrary. We instead identify an initial set of 
statistically significant factors that help explain policy makers’ PPP contract bundling choices. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. International Major Projects Survey for the U.S.. Sectors and Services included. 2013 
Id Economic Sector Number of PPPs 
in Sample 
Percentage 
in Sample 
Percentage of Strong vertical 
integration in Sample 
1 Roads  115 24 39
2 Bridge & Tunnels 23 5 70
3 Rail 32 7 47
4 Airports 29 6 38
5 Ports 8 2 63
6 Water 92 19 44
7 Wastewater 103 22 44
8 Prisons 28 6 89
9 Facilities 31 7 71
10 Other 14 3 36
  475 100 49
   Source: Public Works Financing (PWF) newsletter. 
 
 
Table 2. Classification of contract types between weak and strong vertical integration features.  
Contract Type Weak vertical integration Strong vertical integration
 Construction phase Management Phase
Design and Build X 
Design, Build and Finance X 
Management contract  X
Lease  X
Operate and Maintain  X
Lease and Improve  X 
Design Build and Maintain  X 
Design Build and Operate  X 
Design Build Finance and Maintain  X 
Design Build Finance and Operate  X 
Design Build Operate and Maintain  X 
Joint Development  X 
BOT/BOO/BTO  X 
  Notes: See footnote 3 above for an explanation of these contract types 
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Table 3. Variable description and source for the full U.S. PPP database. 
Variable Description Source
Financial   
Tax_Income State and Local tax revenues per capita (in thousands) in the state where the PPP is 
signed in the year prior to the agreement. 
State and Local Tax 
Burdens: All Years, 
One State
Expenditures Expenditures per capita in the state where the PPP is signed in the year prior to the 
agreement 
Statistical Abstract of 
the United States
Debt State debt outstanding (in millions of current U.S.$) divided by population, in the year 
prior to the agreement 
Statistical Abstract of 
the United States
Contract_size Log of the Project size (i.e. capital cost) in thousands U.S.$ divided by the census 
region’s population. 
PWF 
Economic Sector   
Roads Binary variable taking value 1 when the PPP affects a Network Road; 0 otherwise PWF 
Bridge & Tunnel Binary variable taking value 1 when the PPP affects a Bridge or a Tunnel, 0 otherwise. PWF 
Rail Binary variable taking value 1 when the PPP affects a Railway; 0 otherwise PWF 
Airports Binary variable that taking value 1 when the PPP affects an Airport; 0 otherwise PWF 
Ports Binary variable taking value 1 when the PPP affects a Port; 0 otherwise PWF 
Water Binary variable taking value 1 when the PPP affects a Water project; 0 otherwise PWF 
Wastewater Binary variable taking value 1 when the PPP affects a Wastewater project; 0 otherwise  PWF 
Prison Binary variable taking value 1 when the PPP affects a Prison project; 0 otherwise PWF 
Other Binary variable taking value 1 when the PPP affects other sectors/services; 0 otherwise PWF 
Political   
Repub_Governor Binary variable taking value 1 if the Governor of the State is Republican; 0 otherwise Almanac American 
Politics (Barone); 
Politics in America
Control   
Sponsor Binary variable taking value 0 if the Sponsor signing the PPP is local, and 1 if it is the 
State Government. 
PWF 
Population Log of the Population (in 1000) living in the State in the year prior to the agreement U.S. CENSUS
PPP legislation Synthetic index of how favorable to PPPs is each State’s PPP legislation in the year the 
PPP was signed.  
Geddes and Wagner 
(2013)
Year Year in which the PPP was signed PWF 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics. 
 Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Financial Tax_Income 3.94 1.85 1.41 13.51 
 Expenditures 9.27 22.02 0.30 432.64 
 Debt 3.52 3.08 0.50 17.15 
 Contract_size 440.59 792.77 0 7000 
Economic Sector Network Roads 0.21 0.41 0 1 
 Bridge & Tunnels 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 Rail 0.06 0.23 0 1 
 Airports 0.05 0.22 0 1 
 Ports 0.01 0.12 0 1 
 Water 0.17 0.37 0 1 
 Wastewater 0.19 0.39 0 1 
 Prisons 0.05 0.22 0 1 
 Other 0.02 0.16 0 1 
Political Repub_Governor 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Control Sponsor 0.26 0.44 0 1 
 Population 13.24 10.77 0.57 38.04 
 PPP legislation 2.50 2.31 0 7 
 Year 2003 5.50 1985 2013 
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Table. 5. Multinomial categories: Different groupings of contracts. 
 Benchmark Group Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
Multinomial 1 Bundling of 
Construction and 
Operation tasks 
Bundling of 
Construction tasks only 
Bundling of 
Operation tasks 
only 
  
Multinomial 2 Bundling of 
Construction and 
Operation tasks 
(including design tasks) 
Bundling of 
Construction and 
Operation tasks 
(excluding design tasks) 
Bundling of 
Construction tasks 
only 
Bundling of 
Operation tasks 
only 
 
Multinomial 3 Bundling of 
Construction and 
Operation tasks 
(including design tasks) 
Bundling of 
Construction and 
Operation tasks 
(excluding design tasks) 
Bundling of 
Construction and 
Maintenance tasks 
(including design)  
Bundling of 
Construction 
tasks only 
Bundling of 
Operation 
tasks only 
Note: We cannot provide models with more or other categories because the Maximum Likelihood procedure did 
not converge with the necessary further splitting. 
 
Table 6. Model fit of different multinomial models 
  
 Multinomial 1 Multinomial 2 Multinomial 3 Logistic 
LR Chi2 test 185.372 *** 238.288 *** 263.41 *** 41.54*** 
Log-Lik Full Model -271.898 -353.022 -363.516 -218.689 
McFadden Adj. R2 0.098 0.091 0.074 0.01 
 Note: Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% denoted by ***, **, and * respectively.  
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Table 7. Multimodal logistic regression. Predicted Marginal effects for each category of PPP Contract 
 Variables Strong 
Vertical 
Integration 
 
(I) 
Weak Vertical 
Integration 
Construction 
phase 
(II) 
Weak Vertical 
Integration 
Operation 
phase 
(III) 
Strong 
Vertical 
Integration 
 
(IV) 
Weak Vertical 
Integration 
Construction 
phase 
(V) 
Weak Vertical 
Integration 
Operation 
phase 
 (VI) 
Financial Tax_Income -0.0008 
(0.0194) 
0.0105 
(0.0181) 
-0.0097 
(0.0131) 
-0.0008 
(0.0172) 
0.0105 
(0.0156) 
-0.0097 
(0.0166) 
 Expenditures 0.0147** 
(0.0066) 
-0.0021 
(0.0024) 
-0.0125** 
(0.0056) 
0.0147*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0021 
(0.0023) 
-0.0125*** 
(0.0037) 
 Debt -0.0080 
(0.0112) 
-0.0039 
(0.0106) 
0.0119*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0080 
(0.0084) 
-0.0039 
(0.0071) 
0.0119 
(0.0077) 
 Contract_size 0.0307 
(0.2034) 
-0.0073 
(0.0118) 
-0.0234* 
(0.0133) 
0.0307* 
(0.0164) 
-0.0073 
(0.0125) 
-0.0234*** 
(0.0081) 
Economic 
Sector 
Network Roads -0.1462 
(0.1810) 
0.1465 
(0.1340) 
-0.0004 
(0.0679) 
-0.1462 
(0.0963) 
0.1465* 
(0.0862) 
-0.0004 
(0.0550) 
 Bridge & Tunnels 0.1240 
(0.1178) 
0.0612 
(0.1010) 
-0.1852*** 
(0.0422) 
0.1240 
(0.1550) 
0.0612 
(0.1449) 
-0.1852*** 
(0.0431) 
 Rail -0.1705 
(0.1530) 
0.2289 
(0.1486) 
-0.0584 
(0.0380) 
-0.1705 
(0.1571) 
0.2289 
(0.1436) 
-0.0584 
(0.0613) 
 Airports 0.1564*** 
(0.0499) 
-0.1348*** 
(0.0170) 
-0.0216 
(0.0550) 
0.1564** 
(0.0670) 
-0.1348*** 
(0.0288) 
-0.0216 
(0.0690) 
 Ports -0.0497 
(0.1706) 
-0.1348*** 
(0.0171) 
0.1845 
(0.1756) 
-0.0497 
(0.1883) 
-0.1348*** 
(0.0283) 
0.1845 
(0.1904) 
 Water -0.0948 
(0.1197) 
-0.0645 
(0.0465) 
0.1594 
(0.1067) 
-0.0948 
(0.0999) 
-0.0645 
(0.0415) 
0.1594* 
(0.0931) 
 Wastewater 0.0086 
(0.1195) 
-0.1595*** 
(0.0423) 
0.1508 
(0.1066) 
0.0086 
(0.0904) 
-0.1595*** 
(0.0440) 
0.1508** 
(0.0766) 
 Prisons 0.1445*** 
(0.0685) 
-0.0291 
(0.0503) 
-0.1154*** 
(0.0277) 
0.1445* 
(0.0813) 
-0.0291 
(0.0832) 
-0.1154*** 
(0.0279) 
 Other -0.4236*** 
(0.1268) 
0.0039 
(0.0428) 
0.4196*** 
(0.1287) 
-0.4236** 
(0.2144) 
0.0039 
(0.0968) 
0.4196* 
(0.2172) 
Political Repub_Governor 0.0036 
(0.0365) 
0.0003 
(0.0386) 
-0.0039 
(0.0175) 
0.0036 
(0.0372) 
0.0003 
(0.0260) 
-0.0039 
(0.0238) 
Control Sponsor -0.0394 
(0.0495) 
0.0329 
(0.0316) 
0.0066 
(0.0322) 
-0.0394 
(0.0325) 
0.0329* 
(0.0198) 
0.0066 
(0.0234) 
 Population 0.0809** 
(0.0375) 
-0.0432** 
(0.0191) 
-0.0377 
(0.026) 
0.0809*** 
(0.0304) 
-0.0432** 
(0.0282) 
-0.0377 
(0.0240) 
 PPP legislation -0.00765 
(0.0076) 
0.0043 
(0.0081) 
0.0032 
(0.0045) 
-0.00765 
(0.0090) 
0.0043 
(0.0073) 
0.0032 
(0.0078) 
 Year 0.0002 
(0.0058) 
0.0004 
(0.0029) 
-0.0006 
(0.0054) 
0.0002 
(0.0059) 
0.0004 
(0.0046) 
-0.0006 
(0.0047) 
 Sector-level clusters Yes 
No 
No 
Yes  State-level clusters 
 Time Dummies No No 
 Log likelihood -271.898 
185.372*** 
0.25 
 LR Chi 2 
 Pseudo-R2 
 Adjusted Pseudo-R2 0.10 
Note: ***, **, * Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. In parentheses standard errors clustered by 
economic sector (I, II, III) or by State (IV, V, VI). 
 
Table 8. Multimodal logistic regression estimates. Predicted Marginal effects for each category of PPP 
Contract. Estimates for Transaction costs as drivers of Contract choice. 
Variables Strong Vertical 
Integration (VII) 
Weak Vertical Integration 
Construction phase (VIII) 
Weak Vertical Integration on 
Operation phase (IX) 
Asset specificity 0.4955*** 
(0.1004) 
-0.1506*
(0.0817) 
-0.3448** 
(0.1671) 
Ease of measurement 0.5501 
(0.3685) 
0.0381*
(0.0212) 
-0.5882* 
(0.3578) 
Log likelihood -136.808
43.204*** 
0.158 
LR Chi 2 
Pseudo-R2 
Note: ***, **, * Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. In parentheses, standard errors 
clustered by economic sector. We control for the same variables used in previous models. 
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